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Abstract: This paper examines the impact of the EU Cohesion Policy on the relative development of 
EU countries as well as on the development of NUTS-2 regions within member states. The 
main hypothesis is that the Cohesion Fund payments are reducing inequalities between 
member states, while failing to decrease the regional inequalities within member states in 
the European Union. The basic conclusion is that Cohesion funds should not be viewed as 
the only solution for the problem of regional inequalities in the EU, but rather as a comple-
mentary policy instrument to national regional policies. However, the problem of creating 
institutional capacity for the withdrawal of the Cohesion resources remains emphasized, 
especially in new member states with lower real GDP growth, in order to compete for pro-
jects of highest multiplicative effects on the economy.
Keywords: economic and regional inequalities, Cohesion Policy, convergence, European Union, Eu-
ropean integration
JEL Classifi cation: D63, O47, R11
Introduction
The Cohesion Policy is, together with the Common Agricultural Policy, the fi nan-
cially most signifi cant common policy of the European Union. The goal of the Re-
gional and Cohesion Policy has been defi ned in the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (Articles 2 and 4), which emphasizes the regional policy as a supporter 
of economic and social development with higher employment and equitable and sus-
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tainable growth. In the 2014-2020 fi nancial framework the Cohesion Policy resources 
make up one third of the EU budget (351.8 billion EUR), which makes the Cohesion 
Policy as the main investment instrument of the EU. Regional and Cohesion Policy 
funds are responsible for fi nancing strategic transportation and communication infra-
structure. They encourage the shift to the environmentally responsible economy, de-
velopment of small and medium enterprises (SME), innovation and competitiveness, 
job creation, modernization of educational systems and creation of equitable society.
However, in spite of the wide range of investments and allocation of funds for eco-
nomic and social development, the EU is still characterized by large economic dis-
parities which were exacerbated by the recent economic crisis. Therefore, it is easy 
to comprehend the fact that in every new fi nancial perspective the principle goal is 
to eliminate the limitations apparent in the previous fi nancial plan. In the new 2014-
2020 fi nancial framework economic disparities between core and the periphery have 
been more accentuated and the necessity to come up with solutions to the problems 
which arise from development inequalities of these regions has been emphasized 
(Jovančević, 2012).
The aim of this paper is to analyse the link between the Cohesion Policy and eco-
nomic inequalities in the European Union. With the widening of the EU, the need to 
converge the development of its member states has become more apparent. The EU 
Cohesion Policy became signifi cant as late as in 1986 after the accession of Spain 
and Portugal, by establishing the Cohesion Fund. The Cohesion Policy is not a simple 
mechanism of redistribution between countries and regions. Primarily, its purpose 
is to direct fi nancial transfers towards achieving two goals: regional development 
and economic convergence. Responsibility for regional policy in member states is 
divided. In accordance, regional policy measures depend on the decisions of the cen-
tral government as well as those of regional authorities. The European Commission 
strategy emphasizes the importance of the involvement of regional authorities in the 
decision making process (implementing and fi nancing measures).
Today, the Cohesion Policy is the second largest budgetary expense of the EU 
and it is therefore crucial to explore the justifi cation of invested funds in the context 
of achieving the established goals, which is the main aim of this paper. The core 
hypothesis is that the Cohesion Fund payments decrease the cross-country inequali-
ties, but on the other hand increase regional inequalities within individual countries. 
Apart from justifying the invested funds, it is important to establish if the Cohesion 
Policy reforms had done enough to enable the objective possibility of achieving the 
policy goals. Although literature that studies various effects of the Cohesion Policy 
on the member states’ economies is not scarce, it is diffi cult to conclude that the 
connection has been unambiguously confi rmed. As a consequence, this paper tries to 
additionally explore this research area by conducting the panel analysis.
The paper is structured as follows. The second section presents the overview of 
the existing literature dealing with the effectiveness of the Cohesion Policy. The third 
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section consists of methodology details, while the fourth carries out data sources and 
descriptively analyses the regional inequalities in the EU. The fi fth section presents 
and discusses the results of the panel analysis. The fi nal section highlights the main 
conclusions of the conducted research.
Literature Review
Estimating the impact of the EU Cohesion Policy on the convergence of member 
states contains a problem that has often been overlooked. Underdeveloped regions 
could grow faster due to the lower initial level of development, regardless of the 
amount of received cohesion funds. The key question that arises is: is the generated 
growth in underdeveloped regions suffi cient to justify the amount of funds spent on 
the convergence policy? This section provides an overview of the existing analyses 
of the effectiveness of the Cohesion Policy.
Amin and Tomaney (1995) attribute low growth rates, high unemployment rates 
and rising regional disparities in Europe to the failure of the neoliberal project since 
the 1980s. However, they stress the existing tensions inside EU policy-making be-
tween market-led solutions and active intervention in order to achieve economic ex-
pansion, social justice and solidarity. Furthermore, they point to the fact that innova-
tions in regional policy, in terms of helping underdeveloped regions to improve their 
growth, employment and to reduce poverty, is in a shadow of market-oriented poli-
cies of a signifi cantly larger scope. Sala-i-Martin (1996) compares regional growth 
and the cause of convergence in the EU and the US and comes to the conclusion that 
regional policy of the EU is a failure. Boldrin and Canova (2001) come to the similar 
conclusion by comparing the regional growth in fund receiving regions in the EU 
with the growth in non-receiving regions. 
Jovančević and Globan (2014) analyzed the correlation between received EU funds 
and GDP per capita convergence and showed that the fi nancial crisis has had an impact 
on the weaker convergence of NMS with the old EU-15 in the period 2007-2013. Tak-
ing into account economic indicators, GDP per capita at PPP and the infl ow of FDI in 
the NMS, the authors showed that the impact of FDI on the convergence of NMS was 
strong in the whole period of analysis (2000-2012), however it was less pronounced in 
the second period (2007-2013), after the crisis, which resulted in poor results for eco-
nomic development. Martin (2005) reveals the evidence of convergence between mem-
ber states, but not between the regions. He explores the trade-off between growth and 
regional inequalities stating that gains in productivity cannot be used as an argument 
for regional policy. Theory and evidence suggest that the regional concentration of 
economic activity improves effi ciency. Thus, the EU must decide – wheter it will (i) try 
to limit or even reverse the process of spatial concentration or (ii) focus its policies on 
the acceleration of convergence between the underdeveloped and developed countries.
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Bouvet (2010) investigates income inequalities between 197 European regions in 
the period 1977-2003. She uses panel analysis with the Gini coeffi cient as a measure 
of inequality within individual countries. Independent variables are divided into four 
groups: (i) demographic, (ii) macroeconomic stability, (iii) institutions and policies 
and (iv) the impact of the EMU accession. She concludes that the regional inequal-
ity has decreased in the observed period due to decreased cross-country inequali-
ties. This result justifi es the funds invested in the Cohesion Policy. However, Bouvet 
(2010) warns that the inequality in the EU is still two times larger than in the US. 
Furthermore, the analysis is conducted for the pre-crisis period which puts a large 
question mark on the relevance of these results today.
Becker (2012) suggests that the transfers aiming to increase convergence have, on 
average, been effi cient in generating additional growth in the receiving regions, but 
also states that the system can be improved. He argues that not all regions are equally 
good at utilizing allocated funds to induce additional growth. Thus, the allocation 
of resources to the regions with below-average levels of education of the workforce 
and low-quality government is a waste of scarce resources. The solution he offers for 
these regions is that their investments must be focused on education and government 
quality as means to build the absorption capacity for future EU funding. Obviously 
there is no consensus in the literature whether regional policy has been succesful or 
whether its funding has been reasonably justifi ed. The aim of this paper is to further 
analyse the effects of the Cohesion Policy in an attempt to offer a more convincing 
answer to this question.
Methodology 
In order to test the hypothesis stated in the introduction, we estimate a panel model 
and employ Granger causality tests. Variables that enter the analysis are wcv (weight-
ed coeffi cient of variation of real GDP per capita in 2005 prices), sust (GDP per 
capita in PPS, EU-28=100), koh (paid funds from the Cohesion fund, normalized 
by the country’s GDP), bdp (real GDP per capita), zapp (employment in the primary 
sector as a share in total employment), zaps (employment in the secondary sector as 
a share in total employment), akt (activity of working age females) and soc (social 
transfers as a share in the GDP of the country). Weighted coeffi cient of variation is 
calculated as:
(1)
where y¯ is the country’s average GDP per capita, y
i
 is the GDP per capita of region i, p
i
 
is the share of the country’s total population in region i, and n is the number of spatial 
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units. The advantages of this measure are that it is mean-independent, independent 
of the sizes and the number of spatial units, and robust against single extreme obser-
vations (Lessman, 2013). Moreover, it satisfi es the Pigou–Dalton transfer principle 
which states that a transfer from rich to poor regions should reduce the inequality 
measure (Todaro and Smith, 2005; Lessman, 2013). WCV is a value between 0 and 
1, where 0 implies perfect equality between regions.
The relationship between the Cohesion Policy funds and inequalities is fi rst esti-
mated by analysing the correlation between variables koh and wcv, and koh and sust 
for the cross-country inequalities. In the next step, an unbalanced panel is estimated. 
GDP per capita in PPS in percent of the EU-28 average, denoted as sust, is chosen 
as the dependent variable. The key independent variable is the share of the paid co-
hesion funds in the GDP, denoted as koh. The control variables are the usual deter-
minants of inequality from the literature (Milanovic, 1994: Bouvet, 2010; Lopez and 
Perry, 2008), namely the activity of working age females, real GDP per capita levels, 
social transfers as a share in the GDP of the country, employment in the primary 
sector as a share in total employment, and employment in the secondary sector as a 
share in total employment. 
After conducting the Hausman test, which serves to determine wheter to use fi xed 
effects or random effects model, the latter is used. The data is transformed with log-
aritmic transformation for more intuitive economic interpretation. 
The following equation has been estimated:
(2)
where v
i
 and u
it
 are mutually uncorrelated error terms. 
Afterwards, the Granger causality test is conducted to check if there is causality 
between the variables of interest, and if so, in what direction.
Empirical Data and Analysis
The data on paid cohesion funds are acquired from the European Commission; real 
GDP per capita is calculated based on the Eurostat data, data for employment in 
primary and secondary sectors is acquired from the World Bank data. Working age 
female activity, GDP per capita in PPS and social transfers1 data are all acquired from 
Eurostat.
The European Union consists of 28 member states and 273 NUTS-2 regions. Six 
states consist only of one NUTS-2 region: Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Lux-
embourg and Malta. Therefore, listed countries are excluded from the analysis of 
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regional inequalities since it is diffi cult to disaggregate them to the regional level. 
Furthermore, Croatia is excluded from the analysis because of its late accession to 
the EU in 2013 which makes the data on the regional level too scarce to conduct the 
appropriate analysis.
Figure 1 displays the movement of the weighted coeffi cient of variation (WCV) 
of real GDP per capita (in 2005 prices) in EU-28 for the period 2000-2011. The trend 
of decreasing inequalities is evident for the period until 2008, after which, due to 
the crisis, inequalities again started to rise. It is important to emphasize here that the 
decrease from 0.51 in 2000 to 0.45 in 2011 does not imply a strong inequality de-
crease, considering the relatively large time-span of 12 years. Besides, the WCV level 
of 0.45 still presents a relatively large level of inequality between countries, and the 
goal of the Cohesion Policy should be to signifi cantly reduce this number to achieve 
economic and social cohesion.
Figure 1: Weighted coeffi cient of variation in the EU-28, 2000-2011
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the data from (Eurostat, 2014)
Turning to regional inequalities within member states, a useful illustration to begin 
with is the comparison of the average real GDP per capita (in percent of the EU-28 av-
erage) of the fi rst tertile of developed regions and the bottom tertile of underdeveloped 
regions. This comparison is crucial to understand the problem of regional inequalities, 
since the funds are allocated to statistical regions with the GDP per capita lower than 
75% of the EU average. This analysis highlights the following facts: the level of the av-
erage real GDP per capita in most developed regions is 59% larger than the EU average, 
while in the least developed regions it amounts to 50% of the EU average.
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If the numbers are disaggregated, the results are even more worrisome. For exam-
ple, Inner London has 4.5 times larger GDP per capita than the EU average, while the 
GDP per capita in the least developed NUTS-2 region in the EU (Severozapaden in 
Bulgaria) amounts to only 11% of the EU average (Eurostat, 2014). Table 1 and 2 dis-
play the most and least developed NUTS-2 regions, measured by purchasing power 
standards (PPS) per capita. In Table 1, Inner London is leading with 321% of the EU 
average in PPS per capita. However, when comparing the relative development in PPS 
with that in real GDP per capita, some differences are apparent. For example, and 
perhaps somewhat surprising, Bratislavský kraj lies in the fourth place with PPS per 
capita at 186% of the EU average, while Prague lies in the seventh place with PPS per 
capita at 171% of the EU average. Both are positioned ahead of Vienna in the tenth 
place. Furthermore, there is quite a diversity of countries in top 10 NUTS-2 regions. 
From the 10 most developed regions, three are from Germany, and one from the UK, 
Belgium, Slovakia, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Czech Republic and Austria, 
respectively. This speaks in favour of the hypothesis that the regional inequalities are 
a larger obstacle to cohesion than cross-country inequalities since the most developed 
Slovakian region is on par with regions from Germany and France, while at the same 
time Slovakia is not at the top of the developed countries list. Therefore, these dif-
ferences obviously cannot be reduced by further developing Bratislava, but rather by 
developing the Slovakian areas which are below the EU average.
Table 1: Most developed NUTS-2 regions in PPS per capita in 2011
Region PPS per capita PPS per capita in % of EU average
Inner London (UK) 80,400 321
Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest (BE) 55,600 222
Hamburg (DE) 50,700 202
Bratislavský kraj (SK) 46,600 186
Île de France (FR) 45,600 182
Groningen (NL) 45,600 182
Stockholm (SE) 43,300 173
Praha (CZ) 42,900 171
Oberbayern (DE) 42,200 168
Wien (AT) 41,300 165
Darmstadt (DE) 40,500 162
Source: Eurostat (2014)
Table 2 displays the 10 least developed NUTS-2 regions in the EU. A signifi cantly 
more homogenous structure is immediately evident. Nine out of 10 least developed 
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regions are from Bulgaria and Romania and only one (most developed in this list) 
from Poland.
Table 2: Least developed NUTS-2 regions in PPS in 2011
Region PPS per capita PPS per capita % EU average
Lubelskie (PL) 11,100 44
Nord-Vest (RO) 10,500 42
Sud-Est (RO) 9,900 39
Severoiztochen (BG) 9,400 38
Yugoiztochen (BG) 9,500 38
Severna i yugoiztochna Bulgaria (BG) 8,600 34
Yuzhen tsentralen (BG) 8,100 32
Severen tsentralen (BG) 7,800 31
Severozapaden (BG) 7,200 29
Nord-Est (RO) 7,200 29
Source: Eurostat (2014)
Although the disparities are smaller when observing the purchasing power parity 
instead of current prices (for details see Jovančević, 2012), they are still quite large. 
While underdeveloped regions are at the one third of the EU average, people in most 
developed regions are twice as rich as the average European.
Results and Discussion
Cohesion and inequalities between countries
The previous analysis revealed a downward trend in the level of inequalities between 
EU countries until 2008, after which the trend reverses and inequalities started to rise 
(Figure 1). Now we examine the correlation between the WCV from Figure 1 and 
total paid cohesion funds normalized by the GDP throughout the 2001-2011 period 
(Figure 2). Our analysis suggests that the Cohesion Policy is successful in decreasing 
economic disparities. The correlation is relatively strong, and an approximation with 
the linear trend shows that a rise in the share of paid cohesion funds in the GDP de-
creases WCV, i.e. inequalities between countries.
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Figure 2: Weighted coeffi cient of variation for EU-28 vs. the share of paid cohesion 
funds in GDP in the period 2001-2011
Note: WCV for EU-28 is displayed on the y-axis, while the share of paid cohesion funds in GDP is displayed on 
the x-axis.
Source: authors’ calculations based on the data from (European Commission, 2013; Eurostat, 2014)
However, since only the Cohesion Fund benefi ciaries are observed here, it would 
be useful to analyse the relationship between only those 16 countries. In Figure 3, 
the weighted coeffi cient of variation between those 16 member states in the period 
2000-2011 is shown. It is obvious that the inequalities between these countries are 
quite smaller now, which is in accordance with economic intuition. Also, unlike in 
Figure 1, the positive trend has not been reversed after the crisis, i.e. inequalities are 
still decreasing but at a lower rate.
Figure 3: Weighted coeffi cient of variation between 16 countries benefi ciaries of the 
Cohesion Fund in the period 2000- 2011
Source: authors’ calculations based on the data from (European Commission, 2013; Eurostat, 2014)
 
 
10 Radmila Jovančević, Tomislav Globan, Vedran Recher
If the same WCV is put into correlation with paid cohesion funds in the 16 mem-
ber states, as shown in Figure 4, the connection is even stronger than in the previous 
case. Coeffi cient of determination is 0.68 which suggests a sound relationship be-
tween the two variables. Again, the relationship is in accordance with the goals of 
the Cohesion Policy.
Figure 4:  Weighted coeffi cient of variation between 16 countries benefi ciaries of the 
Cohesion Fund vs. the share of paid cohesion funds in GDP in the period 
2001-2011
Note: WCV for 16 countries is displayed on the y-axis and total share of paid cohesion funds in total GDP for 16 
countries benefi ciaries of the Cohesion Fund is displayed on the x-axis.
Source: authors’ calculations based on the data from (European Commission, 2013; Eurostat, 2014)
In order to analyse the impact of the Cohesion Policy on economic disparities 
between countries in more detail, a random effects panel model has been estimated 
for the 16 countries for the period 2001-2011 (Table 3). 
At the conventional levels of signifi cance, all variables are signifi cant in the mod-
el, except the variable lnakt (Table 3). In other words, female activity does not affect 
the inequalities between countries. The signs are all in accordance with economic 
intuition. If payments from the Cohesion Fund increase by 1%, the convergence to 
the EU average will, on average increase by 0.012%. Although the relationship is pos-
itive, the main question is whether it is strong enough to justify the amount of funds 
paid? A Granger causality test is later conducted to tackle this question. In the esti-
mated model, real GDP per capita has the biggest  positive impact on the inequalities 
between countries, as expected. Social transfers also have a positive and statistically 
signifi cant impact. Employment in primary and secondary sectors have a negative 
impact on convergence with the EU average, as expected. 
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Table 3:  Estimated panel for the impact of the Cohesion Policy on economic in-
equalities between EU member states
Dependent variable lnsust
Number of periods 11
Number of countries 16
Total observations 164
Time period 2001 - 2011
Variable
Coeffi cient 
(Std. error)
lnkoh
0.012414** 
(0.005354)
lnakt
0.036858 
(0.055784)
lnbdp
0.543073*** 
(0.021445)
lnsoc
0.107473*** 
(0.036655)
lnzapp
 -0.050532*** 
(0.007207)
lnzaps
0.209859*** 
(0.043861)
constant
 -1.766161*** 
(0.344300)
R2 0.920438
Adjusted R2 0.917397
Standard Error of regression 0.042188
F-statistic 302.7159
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000
Note: *** denotes signifi cance at 1%, ** at 5%. Standard errors are in the parentheses.
For further analysis of the invested funds, a Granger causality test between the 
two variables is conducted2, the results of which are shown in Table 4. The null hy-
pothesis implies that one variable does not Granger cause the other, while the alter-
native implies causality. As can be seen from Table 4, lagging behind the EU average 
(lnsust) Granger causes the payments from the Cohesion Fund (the null hypothesis is 
rejected), which is the expected fi nding considering that the condition to qualify for 
the cohesion funds is to be below the EU average in terms of GDP per capita. How-
ever, as can be seen from Table 4, reverse causality does not exist.
12 Radmila Jovančević, Tomislav Globan, Vedran Recher
Table 4: Granger causality test between the inequalities between EU countries and 
paid cohesion funds 
Null hypothesis Observations F-statistic p-value
lnsust does not Granger cause lnkoh 130 4.61654 0.0116
lnkoh does not Granger cause lnsust  0.59874 0.5511
The model showed a positive correlation between inequalities across member 
states and paid cohesion funs, but with two important remarks: (i) the relationship is 
weak and (ii) there is no reverse causality, i.e. paid cohesion funds do not cause the 
decrease in inequality between countries. It is therefore very hard to demystify and 
isolate the impact of payments from the Cohesion Fund on the economic inequality 
between countries. Probably more important than the quantity of the funds per se is 
the optimal way to use the funds as means to catch up with more developed coun-
tries (Jovančević, 2012). The key instrument for achieving this is the institutional 
framework of a country, as well as the quality of human capital and the level of cor-
ruption, which can play an important role in the utilization of funds. The Cohesion 
Policy surely plays an important role in boosting the development of underdevel-
oped member states. However, the Cohesion Policy itself is not enough to achieve 
the convergence between countries. It is interesting that the social transfers in the 
model above had a greater impact on reducing inequalities than cohesion funds. It 
is almost paradoxical that, on the one hand, large amounts of money are spent on 
the “economic and social cohesion” objective. In the same time, there are different 
measures of fi scal austerity and insistence on reducing the welfare state and budget 
defi cits imposed on countries. It is important to reconcile the objectives of the Cohe-
sion Policy with national economic policies and avoid using confl icting instruments 
for achieving objectives.
Cohesion and inequalities within a country
In the previous subsection the analysis was focused on the impact of the Cohesion 
Policy funds on economic disparities between member states. Here, similar analy-
sis is employed to analyse inequalities between NUTS-2 regions within individual 
member states, by using wcv as a dependent variable, i.e. the measure of regional 
inequality. Unlike in the previous subsection, the analysis deals only with 11 coun-
tries, because countries with only one NUTS-2 region have been excluded as it is 
impossible to compute the wcv for them.
Figure 5 indicates the relationship between the average wcv for 11 countries and 
the share of cohesion funds in GDP for the period 2001-2011. The distinction from 
Figure 2 and Figure 4 is immediately clear. Here, it is apparent that the rise in Co-
hesion Fund payments is correlated with the rise in regional inequalities. The most 
13Does the Cohesion Policy Decrease Economic Inequalities in the European Union?
“successful” country is Hungary, which has withdrawn most resources (as a share in 
GDP), and at the same time has the largest wcv of 0.48.
Figure 5: Average weighted coeffi cient of variation vs. the share of Cohesion Fund 
payments in GDP in the period 2001-2011
Note: WCV is displayed on the y-axis and the share of paid cohesion funds in GDP is displayed on the x-axis.
Source: authors’ calculations based on the data from (European Commission, 2013; Eurostat, 2014)
It is interesting to note that if the period 2001-2011 is divided into two sub-pe-
riods, in the fi rst one (2001-2004) there is a negative correlation between the two 
variables, which suggests that in this period the relationship was in accordance with 
the Cohesion Policy goals. However, the correlation here is relatively weak, as can be 
seen from Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Average weighted coeffi cient of variation vs. the share of Cohesion Fund 
payments in GDP in the period 2001-2004
Note: WCV is displayed on the y-axis and the share of paid cohesion funds in GDP is displayed on the x-axis.
Source: authors’ calculations based on the data from (European Commission, 2013; Eurostat, 2014)
If the same relationship is observed in the second sub-period, the situation is al-
most exactly opposite, as shown in Figure 7. Therefore, after the eastern enlargement 
of the EU, the payments from the Cohesion Fund are positively correlated with the 
growth of regional disparities. The old member states – Greece, Portugal and Spain – 
are in the lower left part of the chart (i.e. less payments and less inequality) as might 
be expected, taking into account that they started to withdraw the funds about 15 
years earlier. At the same time, the new member states are concentrated in the upper 
right part of the chart (except Slovenia and Poland).
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Figure 7: Average weighted coeffi cient of variation vs. the share of Cohesion Fund 
payments in GDP in the period 2005-2011
Note: WCV is displayed on the y-axis and the share of paid cohesion funds in GDP is displayed on the x-axis.
Source: authors’ calculations based on the data from (European Commission, 2013; Eurostat, 2014)
When the same relationship is observed over time, rather than across countries, 
the same, if not even stronger conclusions are obtained. Out of 11 countries, only in 
Ireland and Portugal have the cohesion funds been negatively correlated with the 
growth in wcv. Additionally, this negative correlation is very weak (coeffi cient of de-
termination below 0.15), while positive correlation in all other countries is somewhat 
stronger. These results have not been included due to space issues but are available 
upon request.
To confi rm these results, a random effects panel model is estimated, results of 
which are shown in Table 5. At the 5% level of signifi cance, variables GDP and 
female activity are not signifi cant in this model. Other variables have signs as pre-
dicted. If the share of paid cohesion funds increase by 1%, the weighted coeffi cient 
of variation (i.e. regional inequality) will on average rise by 0.05%. Obviously, the 
impact of all variables is opposite in comparison with the fi rst model, as could be 
expected. Social transfers could potentially increase regional inequalities because 
they are expected to be higher in developed regions and larger centres of economic 
activity than in less developed regions. This represents an additional pull factor for 
migration and further development of more developed regions. Higher levels of the 
primary sector employment is a general characteristic of less developed rural areas, 
so it could be expected that a rise in employment in these regions leads to a decrease 
in inequality within a country. Likewise, a rise in the secondary sector employment 
usually entails a rise in the employment in more developed urban areas (since there is 
less industry in the rural areas) and therefore the inequality within a country should 
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rise. The basic conclusion, therefore, is that cohesion payments increase the inequali-
ty within a country. However, as said before, this model does not examine the causal-
ity between the two, which is why the Granger causality test is conducted.
Table 5:  Estimated panel for the impact of Cohesion Policy on economic inequali-
ties within EU member states
Dependent variable lnwcv
Number of periods 11
Number of countries 11
Total observations 118
Time period 2001 - 2011
Variables
Coeffi cient
(Std. error)
lnkoh 0.048424* (0.008286)
lnakt
0.740214*** 
(0.437647)
lnsoc 0.778111* (0.144239)
lnbdp  -0.023212 (0.080855)
lnzapp
 -0.153229** 
(0.071770)
lnzaps 0.681150* (0.148056)
constant
 -8.104624* 
(2.472902)
R2 0.920438
Adjusted R2 0.917397
Standard error of regression 0.042188
F-statistic 302.7159
Probability (F-statistic) 0.000000
Note: *** denotes signifi cance at 1%, ** at 5%. Standard errors are in the parentheses.
Granger causality test results are shown in Table 6. Unlike the fi rst model, there is 
bidirectional causality here. Regional inequality Granger causes the payments from 
the Cohesion fund, as expected. But, the payments also Granger cause the rise in 
regional inequalities, which is a quite remarkable result which should concern the 
policy makers in the EU.
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Table 6: Granger causality test between inequalities within EU member states and 
cohesion funds 
Null hypothesis Observations F-statistic p-value
lnwcv does not Granger cause lnkoh 94 4.11537 0.0195
lnkoh does not Granger cause lnwcv  3.87142 0.0244
Based on the evidence provided in the analysis it can be concluded that the EU 
Cohesion Policy affects the agglomeration of economic activity and enhances the 
core-periphery disparities within member states. 
The conducted analysis certainly opens some crucial questions for the future of 
the Cohesion Policy as well as for the potential reforms needed to achieve the conver-
gence goals on the state and regional level.
Conclusions
This paper confi rmed the hypothesis that the Cohesion Fund payments decrease the 
cross-country inequalities, but at the same time failed to decrease regional inequal-
ities within individual countries. Several important fi ndings support this conclusion: 
(i) inequalities between countries in the EU are negatively correlated with the cohe-
sion payments in the 2000-2011 period, i.e. cohesion payments decreased the dis-
parities between countries; (ii) this correlation is relatively weak; (iii) the causality 
exists in one direction - the disparities between countries Granger cause the quantity 
of payments which the country receives; (iv) inequalities between NUTS-2 regions 
within member states are positively correlated with the cohesion payments, i.e. pay-
ments increase the regional inequalities measured by the weighted coeffi cient of vari-
ation, (v) this correlation is relatively strong and (vi) there is bidirectional causality 
– inequalities Granger cause the quantity of cohesion payments and vice versa. This 
paper contributes to its fi eld of research by providing new insights into the relation-
ship between Cohesion fund payments and inequalities in the EU both between and 
within countries – the distinction that has so far mainly been overlooked in the liter-
ature. Results imply that the cohesion funds have not been used effi ciently in previ-
ous fi nancial frameworks, but they should bear more importance in underdeveloped 
member states in the next fi nancial framework 2014-2020. However, it is important to 
emphasize some inherent limitations of the analysis. First, when computing the real 
GDP per capita and WCV, CPI of the member states is used for defl ationary purposes. 
This means that possible differences in prices between regions are ignored. Second, 
inequalities across countries are analysed only for 16 member states benefi ciaries of 
the Cohesion fund. The inclusion of most developed countries in the analysis would 
probably have had signifi cant impact on the results. Third, some NUTS-2 regions for 
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which the data was not available were excluded from the analysis. These regions are: 
Brandenburg (DE), Dresden (DE), Chemnitz (DE), Leipzig (DE), Emilia-Romagna 
(IT) and Marche (IT). Stated conclusions have important implications for EU deci-
sion makers. Validity of the allocated funds for the Cohesion Policy is questionable 
if disparities within member states are growing. Indeed, is it possible to achieve eco-
nomic and social cohesion if only inequalities between countries are decreasing? Co-
hesion programs must accentuate investments needed for growth and job creation as 
means to reduce the unemployment rates, social inequalities and regional disparities. 
That is why the European Commission is suggesting the concentration of resources 
in a few important areas such as employment (especially for the youth), education, 
social inclusion, innovations and energy effi cient economy; and is ready to broaden 
them to ICT infrastructure and measures of digital growth. Examining the effects 
of these new measures is a potentially fruitful topic for future research. Given that 
the EU funds are not a particularly strong instrument for the allocation of resources 
like national budgets, they should not be viewed as the only solution for the problem 
of regional inequalities in the EU, but rather as a complementary policy instrument 
to national regional policies. However, the problem of creating institutional capacity 
to withdraw the Cohesion Fund resources remains emphasized, especially in new 
member states which were not a part of the program for promotion of competitive-
ness and employment in previous fi nancial frameworks. The governments in member 
states with lower real GDP growth have a challenging task to compete for projects 
of highest multiplicative effects on the economy. This is becoming a more and more 
important challenge in the context of the recent crisis and the necessity to improve 
international competitiveness.
NOTES
1 Except for Bulgaria in the period 2001-2005, where data is acquired from the IMF.
2 Granger causality implies precedence, i.e. if one variable Granger causes the other, then the second 
variable can be described by the movement of the fi rst variable in the previous period.
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